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We build a dynamic duopoly model that accounts for the empirical observation
of monopoly persistence in the long run. More speci¯cally, we analyze the condi-
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to undertake pre-emptive R&D investment, (\strategic predation" strategy) that
eventually leads to exit of the follower ¯rm. The follower is assumed to bene¯t from
the innovative activities of the leader through R&D spillovers. The novel feature
of our approach is that we introduce explicit dynamic model and contrast it with
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11 Introduction
Is monopoly an environment conducive to innovation? Is there persistence of monopoly or
there is a change of the identity of innovating ¯rm every while (leapfrogging in jargon)?
This kind of questions is not quite new among economists, but it seems to be actual
again. In a recent issue of the British The Economist (2004), the authors of already
celebrated rubric \Economics Focus" { that time dedicated to monopoly and innovation
{ in the provocatively entitled text \Slackers or Pace-Setters: Monopolies may have more
incentives to innovate than economists have thought" noticed that monopolies may have
much more prominent role in generation innovations than have been previously thought.
The authors further express doubts about the predominant economic theory according
to which \monopolist should have far less incentives to invest in creating innovations
than a ¯rm in a competitive environment." Apparently, there is a controversial role of
market power and monopolies in creating innovations and the key to the answer lies
in the underlying incentives to undertake innovations. The recent empirical evidence
seems to support this Schumpeterian allegations from The Economist: there is a positive
relationship between market power and intensity of innovation (see, for instance, Blundell,
et al., 1999, Carlin et al., 2004, Aghion and Gri±th, 2004). Commenting on this empirical
evidence, Etro (2004) noticed that it \is consistent with pre-emptive R&D investment by
the leaders." As a consequence of such strategic behavior, there may be only one ¯rm
at the end of the day, but this ¯rm would display far more competitive behavior than
standard monopolist; it would respectively generate higher °ow of R&D, charge lower
price and produce more.
There are many real-world examples of monopolistic or dominant ¯rms that invest
more in innovation and R&D than their rivals (see Etro, 2004) and that persists over
long period of time. Here we could, for instance, refer to AT&T1 as an example of such
pattern. Founded in 1885, the company is one of the largest telephone companies and cable
television operators in the world. After becoming a ¯rst long distance telephone network
in the US AT&T made huge investments in research and development. As a result,
the company obtained near monopoly power on long distance phone services. Heavy
investments in R&D together with aggressive behavior on the market allowed AT&T to
1AT&T is a giant old American telecommunications company, publicly listed on the New
York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol T. AT&T provides voice, video, data, and In-
ternet telecommunications services to businesses, consumers, and government agencies (source:
www.sciencedaily.com/encyclopedia/at t).
1obtain crucial inventions and to spread its near monopoly power on other markets. The
company was both buying patents for signi¯cant innovations2 and making innovations
itself3. Only after a suit against AT&T in 1982 followed by the breakup of the company
into several local independent units called \Baby Bells" in 1984 the US telephone industry
became competitive and other companies entered the market. While loosing part of its
market power on the long distance telephone services, the company has continued its
aggressive investments in R&D. For example, in 2004 AT&T introduced a facility allowing
businesses to securely run their private networks without any interruptions on AT&T's
leading global Internet Protocol network. This innovation assures the company to remain
a leader in IP networking. Even AT&T characterizes itself as \backed by the research
and development capabilities of AT&T labs, the company is a global leader in local, long
distance, Internet and transaction-based voice and data services".
The above observations concerning the relation between innovativeness, leadership
and market power motivate our paper in that we aim to describe and analyze a particular
setup in which the persistence of monopoly can arise in the long run. More speci¯cally, we
study the situation in which the market leader undertakes pre-emptive R&D investment,
(or, in our words, adopts \strategic predation" strategy) that eventually leads to exit of
the follower ¯rm or/and prevents or limits the entry of the new ¯rms and we contrast this
situation with the one in which the leader (within the same setup) \accommodates" the
follower, that is, it co-exists with follower in a duopoly market structure. This comparison
will enable us to study both positive aspects of the two main strategies- accommodation
and strategic predation- (like, for instance, which strategy yields higher R&D intensity
or R&D stock) and normative aspect (social welfare implications) of the two resulting
market structures: duopoly versus (constrained or unconstrained) monopoly. The latter
aspect, as we will see, carries important policy implications.
The novel feature of our approach is that we introduce explicit dynamic model and
contrast it with its static (or quasi-dynamic) counterpart. This comparison can be con-
sidered as a topic per se of our paper. Since strategic innovations are inherently dynamic
phenomenon, we argue that suitable model aimed at capturing both accommodating and
the pre-emptive or predatory behavior of the dominant ¯rm should be explicitly dynamic.
Furthermore, to emphasize the role of the leader we assume that he is the only one that
2During the early 1920s, AT&T bought Lee De Forest's patents on the \audion", the ¯rst triode
vacuum tube, which let them enter the radio business (cf. www.sciencedaily.com/encyclopedia/at t).
3AT&T commissioned the ¯rst commercial communications satellite, Telstar I in 1962 (source:
www.sciencedaily.com/encyclopedia/at t).
2invests in innovation while the follower imitates through R&D spillovers. The rationale
for introducing spillovers stems from the fact that innovations, in general, are subject to
R&D spillovers for which the recipients need to have so-called \absorptive capacity," that
is, the \ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment and to
apply it to commercial ends" (Cohen and Leventhal, 1989 and 1990).4 The importance
of R&D spillovers, imitations and its economic implications seem to be well and broadly
documented (in both theoretical and empirical literature; see, for instance, Griliches,
1992). However, most of the theoretical models are static in nature and they focus on the
accommodation strategies. That is, strategic predation is simply ignored or precluded by
assumptions (so that it is never optimal). In such situations unilateral R&D spillovers
create disincentives to invest in R&D and consequently hamper innovations. However, as
we will see soon, in the case when strategic predation is optimal, the economic implication
of R&D spillovers is exactly opposite. They enhance the incentive to invest in R&D.
A static (or quasi-dynamic) simple two-stage duopoly model will serve as a bench-
mark for our subsequent dynamic analysis. This should come at no surprise since the
concept of two stage (or n-stage competition) use to be a standard tool to tackle the
above mentioned types of strategic interactions. That approach concentrates on identify-
ing \strategic e®ects" that in°uences the ¯rst-period behavior and aims to characterize
the resulting strategic rivalry. The concept has been proven successful in a way that
the same strategic principles (e.g. \overinvestment" or \underinvestment") apply in so
many economic environments and the comparative static results from the static oligopoly
theory can be used to provide information about strategic behavior (see Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1984, Tirole,1990, Shapiro, 1989, and Etro 2004). However, the described idea
relies on the arti¯cial time structure since the ¯nal (i.e., second or n-th) period is essen-
tially one of static oligopoly (see Shapiro, 1989). From the perspective of the full-°edged
dynamic model, it gives at best the \steady state values" of the true underlying dynamic
game. Thus, it is lacking the explicit motion of the strategic variables over time and its
accompanying comparative dynamics. More importantly, the set of strategies available
to the ¯rms may be richer than in the corresponding static model. Also, the dynamic
adjustment process is neglected in the n-stage competition games.
In order to contrast the standard static two-stage competition approach with its dy-
namic counterpart, we ¯rst construct a speci¯c two-stage game and then build its ex-
4For an alternative approach that focuses on the incumbent's absorptive capacity see Wiethaus (2005).
Under certain plausible conditions, Wiethaus (2005) demonstrates that monopolist is able to retain its
persistence by strategically investing in excess absorptive capacity.
3plicit dynamic version. More speci¯cally, the benchmark model is two-stage asymmetric
duopoly game in which one ¯rm (say, Firm 1) has strategic advantage in a form of prior
(¯rst stage) investment in R&D that leads to unit costs decrease while the second ¯rm
bene¯ts from the R&D spillovers. In the second stage the two ¯rms compete in quantities.
Thus both ¯rms are assumed to be initially sustainable in the market. We then construct
an explicit dynamic counterpart of that game. To concentrate on the strategic aspects
within the dynamic model we push the tactical decision (i.e. selecting the optimal quan-
tity) in the background and deal with so called reduced form pro¯t function indicating
the ¯rms °ow pro¯ts as functions of unit costs. Unit costs of the ¯rms serve as so-called
\state variables" that are governed through the \control" variable, namely R&D expen-
ditures. Another important feature here is that a passage from the two-stage model to a
dynamic model requires the introduction of a speci¯c adjustment parameter that captures
the speed with which the R&D investments translate into the unit costs reduction (see,
for example, Fersthman and Kamien (1987) and Stenbacka and Tombak (1993) for usage
of a similar approach). This is at the same time more realistic due to the unavoidable
time delay between the R&D investment and corresponding R&D output. The dynamic
approach enables us also to study a behavior of the strategic variable over time and some
of its comparative dynamic e®ects as well as the importance of the adjustment process
that are missing in the simple two-stage framework. Finally, and most importantly, in an
explicit dynamic model we can analyze how the optimal strategy of the ¯rm that possesses
strategic advantage may lead to the change in market structure over the time and thus
create persistence of monopoly. This phenomenon is not possible in the static 2-stage
game. In other words, the strategic advantage of the Firm 1 would enable it to exhibit
pre-emptive behavior (or strategic predation) on its rival turning initial duopoly market
structure into monopoly.
Our analysis provides the following new insights:
a) Strategic predation becomes ever more attractive strategy to pursue when the adop-
tion of the new technology accelerates. More speci¯cally, the parameter space in
which strategic predation is optimal increases with the speed of adjustment param-
eter and soon becomes dominant part of this region. The intuition is that after
initial period (up to time T), the ¯rm might be willing even to incur losses in order
to enjoy monopoly pro¯t till the end of time. Thus, unlike in a static game, in a
fully dynamic model the costs of predation last only for a limited period and have to
be contrasted to the in¯nite stream of the monopoly pro¯t afterwards. As a conse-
4quence, Firm 1 displays more aggressive behavior compared with its behavior in the
two-stage game. Moreover, the innovative e®ort, and output are usually bigger (and
price lower) compared to the situation in which the leading ¯rm adopts accommo-
dation strategy. This in turn results in a larger generated social welfare in monopoly
than in related duopoly setup. However, for the comparison of these two strategies
(accommodation versus strategic predation) to be possible, both strategies have to
be initially feasible, and that in turn requires the level of R&D spillovers not to
be \too large". Thus, our model generates results that are consistent with recent
empirical ¯ndings reported in the \Economic Focus" (The Economist, May 2004).
Etro (2004) developed an alternative model that is also consistent with the above
stylized facts. In his model, the persistence of monopoly requires a large number of
potential entrants.
b) The underling dynamic optimization problem in the case of strategic predation is
rather di®erent than in the case of duopoly where ¯rms maximize their discounted
pro¯t over in¯nite time horizon. In the case of the strategic predation Firm 1 aims to
minimize the time that leads to the expulsion of Firm 2 from the market. The idea
here is that Firm 1 may even bear temporary losses in order to enjoy the monopoly
position later on. Imposing an upper bound of the sustainable strategic losses that
Firm 1 is willing to sacri¯ce over period from zero till T, su±ces to determine the
lower bound on the minimum time to force the exit. This approach formalizes the
\long purse" story.
c) The time pattern of the R&D investment crucially depends of the equilibrium strat-
egy: if accommodation is an optimal strategy, then Firm 1 commits to the R&D
path which steadily increases over time towards the unique steady state value. When
on the other hand the strategic predation is an optimal strategy, the time pro¯le of
R&D is reversed: that is, the shorter the target time, T, at which Firm 2 is forced to
exit, the higher the "predatory" level of R&D investment has to be. In other words,
the level of optimal R&D investment decreases with the increase in the target time.
(Note that to force an immediate exit of Firm 2 is not viable since it would require
an in¯nite amount of R&D, if the speed of adjustment is ¯nite.)
d) As a ¯nding of an independent interest, we show that the steady state values of
the R&D investment in a dynamic model can be interpreted as a generalized values
of the equilibrium values obtained in the two-stage approach. If the adjustment is
5instantaneous (meaning that there is no time delay between the R&D input and its
output) as implicitly assumed in a two stage game, or the rate of time preference
(or interest rate) is neglected, then these two sets of values coincide.
2 The Two-Stage Competition
The basic static model is a two-stage game (see, for instance, · Zigi· c 1998, 2000). In the
¯rst stage, Firm 1 chooses its R&D expenditure, x, that, at the same time, represents the
level of R&D investment. In the second stage, the ¯rms compete in quantities. Firm 1
has unit costs of production (c1):







where the parameters g and c0 describe the e±ciency of the R&D process and pre-
innovative unit costs, respectively. The expression
p
gx is an \R&D production function",
where, as in Chin and Grossman (1990), g 2 (0;4) (the upper bound of this interval is
determined by the required positivity of the monopoly output).
Firm 2 bene¯ts through spillovers from the R&D activity carried out by Firm 1. Its
unit cost function is
c2 = c0 ¡ ¯
p
gx; ¯ 2 [0;1]; (2)
where ¯ denotes the level of spillovers (which, say, re°ects the strength of intellectual
property rights (IPR) protection).
We assume the linear inverse demand function: P = A¡Q. The parameter A captures
the size of the market (where A > c0), variables q1 and q2 denote the quantities of the
two ¯rms' production, and Q ´ q1 + q2 represents the aggregate supply.
In the second stage, given Firm's 1 R&D investment, the two ¯rms engage in Cournot-
Nash competition. Firm 1 maximizes pro¯t net of the R&D expenditures. The ¯rst-order
condition for a maximum yields A ¡ 2q1 ¡ q2 ¡ c1 = 0. The optimization problem for
the ¯rm 2 is similar yielding the analogous ¯rst-order condition: A ¡ 2q2 ¡ q1 ¡ c2 = 0.
Solving the \reaction functions" yields the Cournot outputs and price as functions of
R&D investment:
q1(x) =
A ¡ 2c1 + c2
3
; q2(x) =
A + c1 ¡ 2c2
3
; P(x) =
A + c1 + c2
3
: (3)
Substituting expressions (3) into the pro¯t function yields Firm's 1 pro¯t function ex-
pressed in terms of R&D investment:
¼1(x) =
(A ¡ 2c1 + c2)2
9
¡ x = q
2
1 ¡ x: (4)
6In the ¯rst stage of the game, Firm 1 selects x to maximize its pro¯t. By substituting




(A ¡ c0)2(2 ¡ ¯)2g
(9 ¡ (2 ¡ ¯)2g)2 (5)
It is straightforward to check that Firm's 1 R&D e®ort decreases with an increase in
spillovers, that is, @x¤
@¯ < 0.
Since spillovers are in general imperfect (¯ < 1), there is a critical value of R&D
e±ciency, gd (leading to critical unit cost asymmetry between two ¯rms, that in turn lead
to zero pro¯t of Firm 2), de¯ned as a function of ¯ by
gd(¯) =
3
(1 ¡ ¯)(2 ¡ ¯)
; (6)
such that for g > gd duopoly ceases to exist (see Figure 1). Equivalently, for any given
g, there exist a critical value ¯d below which duopoly is not viable. This critical value is
simply obtained by inverting (6).
When R&D e±ciency exceeds gd two possibilities may occur: unconstrained monopoly
and monopoly constrained by the credible threat of entry by Firm 2 (or shortened \con-
strained monopoly"). To see this, let us look ¯rst at the optimal quantity, R&D expen-
ditures and price if unconstrained monopoly emerges. Firm 1, which is now assumed to
be a monopolist, maximizes
max¼m = (A ¡ qm)qm ¡ c1qm ¡ x: (7)
The ¯rst-order condition for a maximum yields A ¡ 2qm ¡ c1 = 0. Solving for qm and
substituting in (7) yields ¼m(x). Substituting expression (1) for c1 into the ¼m(x) and
maximizing with respect to the R&D investment (x), we obtain
xm =
(A ¡ c0)2g
(4 ¡ g)2 (8)
with the corresponding price as:
pm =
A(2 ¡ g) + 2c0
4 ¡ g
(9)
(note that spillovers play no role in the case of monopoly).
5We assume that c0 is su±ciently large in all cases so that the non-negativity constraint on c1 does
not bind. The second-order condition is satis¯ed for all permissible values of parameters, so the optimal
expenditure, x¤ is always positive.
7To ¯nd the parameters values which allow for pure monopoly to exist, we have to
evaluate the reduced pro¯t function of Firm 2, that is, ¼¤
2(x), at Firm 1 optimal R&D in-
vestment level expressed in terms of parameters and determining the region of parameters
that leads to ¼¤
2(xm) · 0. Equivalently, for Firm 1 to acquire an unconstrained monopoly
position, it is necessary that pm · c0 ¡ ¯
p
gxm. Such a post-innovative situation is that
in which \drastic innovation" takes place (see Tirole, 1990). By substituting for pm and





such that for g > gp the equilibrium market form is unconstrained monopoly. The critical
spillovers level below which Firm 1 gains unconstrained monopoly position is labelled as
¯p.
However, if we compare this critical condition with the one required to sustain an
asymmetric duopoly, we see that there is a region of parameters ¯ and g where there is
neither pure monopoly nor sustainable duopoly (the area between gp and gd in Figure 1).
Insert Figure 1 HERE
If the degree of spillovers and the e±ciency of cost reductions happen to be in this
region, Firm 1 exhibits so called \strategic predation," (i.e. it chooses R&D expenditures
in such a way as to cause q¤
2 = 0 in equilibrium and thus induces the exit of Firm 2).
Note that the e±ciency parameter g in this situation is in the range of
3





whereas ¯ stays below 1
2. There are two useful corollaries resulting from the above dis-
cussion: Firm 1 can enjoy the monopoly position only if spillovers are \small" (¯ < 1
2)
and the R&D e±ciency is rather high, more speci¯cally, g ¸ gp(¯) has to hold. Second,
since strategic predation is an option always available to Firm 1, this strategy is optimal
only if spillovers and the R&D e±ciency are in the region described by (11). Note that







where subscript p stands for predation. Notably, in the region of optimality of predation
x¤
p increases in ¯.
83 The Dynamic Counterpart of the Static Model:
The Case of Duopoly
3.1 Setting of the Problem
We ¯rst consider the setup in which both ¯rms operate over an in¯nite time horizon.
Firm 1 aims to determine its optimal R&D path that maximizes its discounted stream
of pro¯t (or, equivalently, its market value) over time. In doing so it takes into account
the e®ect of R&D spillovers on its competitor's unit costs. As already mentioned in the
introduction, it is convenient to analyze this issue by relying on the reduced form pro¯t
function that depends only on the ¯rms' respective unit costs. The unit costs are in
turn the function of the central strategic variable R&D investment. In order to build the
genuine dynamic model, we assume that it takes time for R&D investment to transform
into unit costs' decrease (otherwise the problem would be inherently static, see discussion
in footnote 12). Thus, there is a \speed of adjustment" coe±cient that captures the above
mentioned time delay (more precisely, the inverse of it). In this respect our model closely
follows that of Stenbacka and Tombak (1993) (see also Fershtman and Kamien (1987) for
a similar approach).
Technically, the problem for Firm 1 is represented as an in¯nite horizon optimal control



















= ¹(c0 ¡ c2(t) ¡ ¯
p
gx(t));
with initial conditions c1(0) = c2(0) = c0, where x(t) is the control variable (R&D expen-
ditures), c1(t) and c2(t) are the state variables (costs of production).6;7
6Subscript 2 refers to Firm 2; subscript 1 refers to Firm 1 and will be omitted in what follows.
7Our model can be easily adopted to capture the e®ect of R&D subsidization by introducing a new






[¦1(c1(t);c2(t)) ¡ x(t) + sx(t)]e¡rtdt:
Qualitatively, little will change in our analytical approach (developed further in Sections 3 and 4) though.
9Note that the laws of motions (a) and (b) require su±cient perpetual investments in
order to prevent the costs from increasing. If the investment is not su±cient, the costs
tend to reverse back to its initial value c0. In particular, when there is no investment in
R&D, the costs will converge to c0. This can be interpreted as some kind of depreciation
of knowledge or skills.8
At each point in time, gross pro¯t function (that is, R&D costs are not subtracted) is
given by
¦1(c1;c2) = (p ¡ c1)q1 = (A ¡ (q1 + q2) ¡ c1)q1; (14)
with q1(t) and q2(t) denoting quantities of good produced, while constants c0 (pre-innovative
unit costs) and ¯ 2 [0;1] (the level of spillovers) are equivalent to those in the static model.
New parameter is ¹ > 0 { the speed of adjustment, while g { the e±ciency of R&D pro-
cess { now belongs to the interval (0;4½) due to the requirement for monopoly output to
be positive in the dynamic context (see Section 4.4 or Vinogradov and · Zigi· c, 1999). The
parameter ½ can be viewed as a so-called \generalized discount factor" and is de¯ned in
the following subsections. Symmetrically to ¦1, instantaneous gross pro¯t function for
Firm 2, ¦2 is de¯ned as
¦2(c1;c2) = (p ¡ c2)q2 = (A ¡ (q1 + q2) ¡ c2)q2:
If ¦i are maximized at each point in time, we can obtain q1 and q2 as functions of c1 and
c2 from the ¯rst order conditions (which are the same as in the two-stage model):9
@¦1
@q1
= A ¡ 2q1 ¡ q2 ¡ c1 = 0;
@¦2
@q2
= A ¡ q1 ¡ 2q2 ¡ c2 = 0; (15)








(A + c1 ¡ 2c2) (16)
and price
p = A ¡ (q1 + q2) =
1
3
(A + c1 + c2): (17)
8Then ¹(c0 ¡ ci(t)) corresponds to the depreciation rate (with i = 1;2).
9Here we implicitly assume that Firm 1 and Firm 2 form a duopoly irrespective of the value of x.
However, later in Lemma 6 it will be shown that the duopoly is not necessarily sustainable.
10On the other hand, given (15) we can also express ci as functions of qi:
c1 = A ¡ 2q1 ¡ q2;
c2 = A ¡ q1 ¡ 2q2: (18)



















thus the linear transformation (16) brings the optimal ¦1 into symmetric diagonal quadratic
form in the (q1 ¡ q2) plane.
Now we are in a position to re-formulate the initial problem. Applying transformation




(¡2_ c1 + _ c2)






(_ c1 ¡ 2_ c2)
= ¹(B ¡ q2 + °2
p
x); (21)
where B = 1
3(A¡c0), °1 = 1
3(2¡¯)
p
g, °2 = 1
3(2¯ ¡1)
p
g. Similarly, the price pattern
can be described by the following di®erential equation
_ p = ¹((B + c0) + p(t) ¡ (°1 + °2)
p
gx): (22)
With state equations (20){(21), the optimal control problem (13) loses one state dimension

















3.2.1 The First Order Conditions




¡rt + ¸(t)¹(B ¡ q1(t) + °1
p
x(t)): (25)









¡rt ¡ ¸¹ + _ ¸ = 0; (27)
and the transversality condition is
lim
t!+1
¸(t)q(t) = 0: (28)




















and thus equation (27) becomes
_ x = 2(r + ¹)x ¡ 2°¹q
p
x: (29)
Equation (29) determines the dynamics of the optimal R&D path. Let us introduce the
new control variable z ´
p
x. Since _ x = 2z _ z, the substitution x = z2 linearizes the
equation of motion of the control variable x (29); thus
_ z = (r + ¹)z ¡ °¹q: (30)
Finally, the joint dynamics of the state and control variable is given by the following
system of linear di®erential equations
_ z = (r + ¹)z ¡ °¹q; (31)
_ q = ¹(B + °z ¡ q); (32)
which is investigated in detail in the remaining part of this section.
3.2.2 Existence of the Equilibrium (Steady State) in Duopoly
Let us de¯ne ½ as ½ = r
¹ + 1. The parameter ½ can be interpreted as a generalized
discount factor, that is the interest rate corrected by the speed-of-adjustment coe±cient:
given r, the higher the level of ¹ is, the faster R&D investment materializes, and the more
important the future becomes.




r + ¹(1 ¡ °2)
=
B°
½ ¡ °2 =
(A ¡ c0)(2 ¡ ¯)
p
g







r + ¹(1 ¡ °2)
=
B½
½ ¡ °2 =
3(A ¡ c0)½
9½ ¡ g(2 ¡ ¯)2: (34)
Since z(t) must be non-negative, the equilibrium may arise only in the positive quad-
rant (i.e., z¤ > 0; q¤ > 0). Therefore, the equilibrium exists if and only if °2 < ½, or,
equivalently, if and only if r + ¹(1 ¡ °2) > 0 or (2 ¡ ¯)2 <
9½
g , or g <
9½
(2¡¯)2.
It is straightforward to show that the values (33) and (34) coincide with the static
equilibrium values in the corresponding two-stage game10 if ½ = 1, what in turn requires
that either discount rate is zero or that the impact of R&D investment is instantaneous
(that is, the speed of adjustment is in¯nite, ¹ = 1). This is more general result than the
one obtained by Kobayashy (2001) where in his somewhat di®erent approach the steady
state values collapses to the corresponding two-stage game equilibrium only if discount






(r + ¹(1 ¡ °2))2 > 0:
Note that similar to the two-stage game the equilibrium values of R&D expenditures








(A ¡ c0)(2 ¡ ¯)
p
g







g(9½ + g(2 ¡ ¯)2)





















3(A ¡ c0)½ ¢ 2g(2 ¡ ¯)
(9½ ¡ g(2 ¡ ¯)2)2
¶
< 0:
3.2.3 The Dynamics of R&D and Output
The existence of a unique equilibrium also implies the existence of an optimal path of R&D
and output converging to this equilibrium (in particular, the existence of the \optimal
control" path for x), as we show below:
10E.g., see equation (5) for equilibrium R&D in a static version of our model.
11Kobayashy (2001) made a di®erential game version of the D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) two-
stage game where the dynamics of the model stems from a depreciation of R&D stock rather than from
the speed of adjustment.
13Lemma 1 If °2 < ½ (i.e. g <
9½
(2¡¯)2) then there exists a unique optimal path of x,
converging to the steady state.
For proof of Lemma 1 see Appendix.
Let us assume now that in what follows the inequality °2 < ½ always holds true. It
can be re-arranged as







and has two important implications on the existence of the optimal control path indepen-
dent on °:
Lemma 2 For any °, the optimal control always exists if either (i) g < 9
4½, or (ii) ¹ < 9
7r.
For proof of Lemma 2 see Appendix.
Next we determine the analytical solution to system (31, 32). Straightforward com-
















½ ¡ °2 ¢
2°
½ + 1 +
p










Then, the price pattern induced by investments zopt is
popt(t) =
B°(° + °2)








¤ = (B + c0) ¡ (° + °2)
p
gz
¤ = A ¡ (A ¡ c0)
6½ ¡ g(2 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¯)
9½ ¡ g(2 ¡ ¯)2 : (39)
Note that if an adjustment takes place instantaneously (¹ = 1), then
q(t) ´ q
¤; z(t) ´ z
¤;













(9 ¡ g(2 ¡ ¯)2)r
: (40)
12Alternatively, we can ¯nd the optimal solution under instantaneous adjustment scenario by applying
so-called Euler's equation: See Appendix for details of derivation.
14Also note that the optimal R&D investment monotonically increases and the price
monotonically decreases over time towards their steady state values.13 As noted earlier,
the steady-state value of investments is higher with higher values of ¹ and coincides with
its static counterpart when ¹ ! 1. In this case, the adjustment becomes instantaneous,
and the speed of convergence (as measured by the absolute value of the exponent in (36),
(37)) monotonically increases.14 The rationale is that a higher rate of transformation of
R&D inputs into lower unit costs (higher ¹) decreases the time gap between the R&D
investment and its bene¯ts expressed in terms of future pro¯ts. As a consequence, for
higher ¹, the convergence of the R&D investments towards the steady-state is faster.
Figure 2 displays time paths of R&D levels, while Figure 3 plots the growth rates of R&D
expenditures (the speed of convergence of R&D to the steady state values), for di®erent
¹.
Insert Figure 2 HERE
Insert Figure 3 HERE
3.3 Feasibility of Duopoly
Let us now address the issue of feasibility of a duopoly. In a duopoly scenario, quantities
of goods produced by both ¯rms must be strictly positive: q(t) > 0; q2(t) > 0 for all
t ¸ 0. (Recall the initial conditions: q(0) = q2(0) = 1
3(A ¡ c0) = B.)
It can be easily shown, that Firm 1 always produces a positive quantity of goods:
Lemma 3 q(t) > 0 for all t ¸ 0 and all feasible ¯; g.
For proof of Lemma 3 see Appendix.
For Firm 2 to operate, however, it is su±cient (but not necessary) that ¯ > 1
2. In
other words, neither strategic predation nor unconstrained monopoly are viable in this
¯-region: given the upper bound of technological e±ciency (g < 4½) high technological
spillovers prevent the critical gap in unit costs for monopoly to occur.
13Obviously, the exponent is negative, since ½ > °2.
14Note that due to the condition °2 < ½ = 1+ r
¹, the inequality ° < 1 is necessary in order to have the
set of feasible values of ¹ unbounded.
15Lemma 4 If ¯ 2 (1
2;1) then q2(t) > 0 for all t ¸ 0 (no matter what the value of g is).
Proof:
Since °2 > 0 for ¯ 2 (1
2;1), the proof repeats that of Lemma 3.
Q.E.D.
If the steady state value of q2 were non-positive, q¤
2 · 0, it would indicate that Firm
2 can not compete with Firm 1 in the long run. Thus the inequality q¤
2 · 0 implies that
the duopoly is not sustainable in the long run and strategic predation may become an
optimal strategy. In other words, if exists T such that q2(T) = 0 then Firm 2 may not be
capable of survival after T (T can be either ¯nite or in¯nite). If Firm 1 eliminates Firm




(1 ¡ ¯)(2 ¡ ¯)
: (41)
Technically speaking, the condition of non-sustainability of duopoly can be formalized as
follows:
Lemma 5 For q¤
2 to be non-positive, it is necessary that ¯ < 1
2 and su±cient that g ¸ gd.
For proof of Lemma 5 see Appendix.
From Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 we conclude that Firm 1 coexists with Firm 2 if ¯ > 1
2
and Firm 1 eliminates Firm 2 if g ¸ gd. Note that for g · 4½ these conditions cannot
hold simultaneously, since ¯ > 1
2 implies gd > 4½ (see also Figure 5). The border case
¯ = 1
2 requires an additional comment. If ¯ = 1
2 then Firm 2 always produces the ¯xed
quantity (equal to B) of the good, with no respect to R&D activity performed by Firm
1. If g < gd and ¯ · 1
2 then constrained monopoly may emerge.
Summing up we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 6 Let ¯ ¸ 0. Then in the steady state the following statements hold:
1. The condition ¯ > 1
2 implies that duopoly is sustainable.
2. The condition g ¸ gd implies that duopoly is not viable in the long run.
16The equality g = gd represents an upper boundary on values of g where duopoly is
feasible. It is easy to observe that gd decreases in ¹ and becomes 3
(1¡¯)(2¡¯) as ¹ ! 1.
Interestingly, this is the same critical value as in the static model (see expression (6)).










. Furthermore, observe that viability of duopoly implies the existence
of the optimal control (but not vice versa) and that the range of parameters in which
dynamic duopoly is viable is broader than in its static counterpart due to the fact the
di®erence in unit cost of the two ¯rms does not occur immediately and due to the fact
that discount rate is in general positive.
4 Achieving Monopoly Position
4.1 Phase I: Strategic Predation
Instead of dealing with an in¯nite-horizon problem, let us consider a time-optimal prob-
lem with a horizontal terminal line. The objective of Firm 1 now is to reach the target
of elimination of Firm 2 in the minimum amount of time and to gain a position of con-





¡1dt subject to the following constraints and terminal conditions:
_ q = ¹(B ¡ q + °
p
x); q(t) ¸ 0; q(0) = B; (42)
_ q2 = ¹(B ¡ q2 + °2
p
x); q2(0) = B; q2(T) = 0; T is free; (43)
given that the optimal control x lies within the interval [0;xu] (the value of xu is to be
computed later; this is the so-called big-bang control).
Since Lemma 3 implies that q(t) > 0 for all t, and q(0) = q2(0) = B, the constraints
in (42) do not bind. Therefore, on substituting z for
p







subject to _ q2 = ¹(B ¡ q2 + °2z);
q2(0) = B; q2(T) = 0; T is free; and z 2 [0;z
u]:
The Hamiltonian associated with this problem is
H = ¡1 + ¸(¹(B ¡ q2 + °2z)):
17If ¸ > 0 then the optimal zo = zu, if ¸ < 0 then zo = 0. The equation of motion is




which integrates to ¸(t) = ·e¹t, · is an arbitrary constant.
The transversality condition reads as [H]t=T = 0, i.e.
¡1 + ¸(¹(B + °2z
o)) = 0: (45)
If ¸ < 0 then zo = 0 and (45) has no solution. Therefore, ¸ > 0, which yields · > 0 and
zo = zu.
With zo = zu for all t we can express the equation of motion of the state variable as
_ q2 + ¹q2 = ¹(B + °2z
u);





2(0) ¡ B ¡ °2z
u)e
¡¹t + B + °2z














Note that the positivity of T demands for the negativity of both the numerator and the
denominator: B + °2zu < 0 and °2zu < 0. Again, this observation is consistent with the
fact that predation can only take place with ¯ < 1
2 and q¤
2 · 0.











Once zu(T) is known, it also becomes possible to evaluate optimal output in strategic
predation from the equation
_ q = ¹(B ¡ q + °z
u(T)) (49)
Equation (49) has a close-form solution (recall the initial condition q(0) = B):
q(t) = °z
u(T)(1 ¡ e












15For an alternative approach to the optimal predation problem, see Appendix.






1 ¡ e¡¹T :
Interestingly this pattern is independent on parameters ¯ and g. However, the optimal
predation time might depend on them (see part 5.2).
In particular, at time t = T, when Firm 2 is eliminated, we get




and q2(T) = 0. Note that q(T) is positive if and only if ¯ < 1
2. Hence only ¯ < 1
2 allows
for predation. On the other hand, if ¯ ¸ 1
2, the only feasible market structure is duopoly
(see also Lemma 6).
With q(T) given by (51), the ¯rms' costs at time T are c1(T) = A ¡ 2q(T) and
c2(T) = A ¡ q(T). Interestingly, all these values do not depend on time T. Hence,
no matter at which time Firm 2 is eliminated, Firm 1 has the same starting point16 as
(constrained) monopolist.
Note that the optimal time pro¯le of R&D investments is declining with T. The shorter
the desired time for the elimination of the competitor is, the larger R&D investment should
be. This functional relationship between zu and T can be depicted as in Figure 4. This
result deserves a special emphasis, for on the one hand (48) enables us to ¯nd the optimal
level of R&D expenditures needed to eliminate Firm 2 after any given point in time T,
and on the other hand it establishes the relationship between the static model and its
dynamic counterpart, proving once again that the static model is in a sense just a limiting
case of the dynamic one.
Insert Figure 4 HERE
In particular, if the speed of adjustment is unlimited (¹ ! 1), then for any T, zu











Finally, note that, contrary to the case of duopoly, we have now dzu=d¹ < 0. That is,
the quicker the speed at which the R&D investment materializes in the unit cost reduction,
the lower the predatory expenditures that lead to expulsion of Firm 2.
16I.e., the unit costs and quantities of both ¯rms are the same irrespectively of T.
19The above analysis can be read as formalization of the \long-purse" story (see, for
instance, Sherrer and Ross, 1990, and Tirole, 1990) in a distinctive way since the result is
not based on the information asymmetry nor imperfections on the ¯nancial markets (cf.
Tirole (1990), Telser (1966), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), etc.).
In order for strategic predation to be feasible (in our model), it is necessary that
c1(T) ¸ 0, which means that the costs do not become negative in the predation phase.
This condition can be equivalently formulated as




The above restriction is also supported empirically by Griliches (1992) who, in his sum-
mary of the empirical work on R&D spillovers, ¯nds that typical values of ¯ range between
0:2 and 0:4. Note that ¹ ¯ < 1
2 due to condition A > c0.
4.2 Constrained and Unconstrained Monopoly
Suppose that Firm 2 is eliminated at time T > 0. At this point, Firm 2's unit costs
become equal to the equilibrium price. Since then, it will not be active in the market, if
Firm 1 sets price not exceeding Firm 2's unit costs. Obviously, Firm 1 will either choose





This price comes from maximization of gross instantaneous pro¯t ¦1 = (p ¡ c1)(A ¡ p)
and correspond to setting the monopoly quantity qm = 1
2(A¡c1). Note that qm is actually
best response to q2 = 0.
If pm < c2, then Firm 1 is free to set the monopoly price pm which does not allow Firm
2 to re-enter the market. In this case we say that Firm 1 is an unconstrained monopolist.
On the other hand, if pm ¸ c2, Firm 1 can set c2 as the highest price that will keep Firm
2 out of the market.17 In this case, we say that Firm 1 is a constrained monopolist.
We will assume that, after time T, Firm 2's costs c2(t) follow the standard equation
of motion _ c2 = ¹(c0 ¡ c2(t) ¡ ¯
p
gx(t)) with no spillovers available any further, that is,
with ¯ = 0, i.e.,
_ c2 = ¹(c0 ¡ c2(t)): (54)
17The pro¯t of Firm 1 is increasing in p for p · pm.
20This re°ects the fact, that an inactive ¯rm does not acquire any new technology via
spillovers and its costs behave as if there would be no spillovers, i.e., there is some de-
preciation of knowledge, skills, etc.18 As a consequence, Firm 2's costs actually increase
after time T.
Since c2 is now independent on Firm 1's R&D investments, we can solve the equation
(54) with the initial value c2(T) = c2T = A ¡ q(T) = A ¡ (A ¡ c0)
1¡¯
1¡2¯. The solution can
be written as
c2(t) = Ke




(1 ¡ 2¯)e¡¹T : (55)
Recall that c2(t) is increasing over time and converges to c0 as T ! 1. Further note that
at time T we have c2(T) = A¡q(T) = 1
2(A+c1(T)) = pm(T), i.e., the unconstrained and
constrained monopoly prices are the same.19 At this point, if Firm 1's R&D investments
are high enough, so that the monopoly pm price does not exceed c2 (or equivalently its
costs do not exceed 2c2¡A), may set price pm and become unconstrained monopolist. On
the other hand, if the R&D investments are low, the monopoly price pm may be higher
than c2 and Firm 1 becomes a constrained monopolist.
4.3 Phase II: Constrained Monopoly Optimization Problem
If Firm 1 becomes a constrained monopolist, it sets price pcm(t) = c2(t), corresponding to
quantity qcm(t) = A ¡ c2(t). Then its instantaneous gross pro¯t function is
¦cm = (c2(t) ¡ ccm(t))(A ¡ c2(t)):






[(c2(t) ¡ ccm(t))(A ¡ c2(t)) ¡ x(t)]e
¡rtdt; (56)
subject to
18There are several other speci¯cations how the unit costs of Firm 2 change after time T. The ¯rst
alternative would be that they do not change at all, i.e., c2(t) = c2(T) for t ¸ T. This can be interpreted
as if the inactive ¯rm is \freezed" and can enter the market in the same state as it exited in. Another
plausible speci¯cation would be to consider c2(t) following after time T the same equation of motion as
before (with unchanged spillovers), i.e., _ c2(t) = ¹(c0 ¡c2(t)¡¯
p
gx(t)). Such setting can be interpreted
as if Firm 2 still acquires new technology via spillovers at the same rate as before and \waits" for a right
time to enter the market again.









= ¹(c0 ¡ c2(t)):
Note that the post-predatory price, which is c2(t), is now increasing over time. This
is consistent with the empirical observation that the leader's price increases after the
predation phase has been completed.












(1 ¡ 2¯)(r + 2¹)
¶
: (57)




4(1 + r=¹)2 as t ! 1.
4.4 Phase II: Unconstrained Monopoly Optimization Problem
If Firm 1 becomes an unconstrained monopolist, it sets the (unconstrained) monopoly
price. This price is equal pm(t) = 1
2(A + cm(t)) and corresponds to quantity qm(t) =
1
2(A ¡ cm(t)). These yield Firm 1's optimal instantaneous gross pro¯t function
¦m = (pm(t) ¡ cm(t))qm(t) = (qm(t))
2:


















= ¹(Bm ¡ qm(t) + °m
p
x(t)); (59)
with Bm = 1
2(A ¡ c0) and °m = 1
2
p
g. However, the initial condition is qm(T) = q(T)
in this case. Proceeding in the same way as in Section 3.2 we obtain a system of two























22Note that in order for the equilibrium values to be positive, it is necessary and su±cient
that g < 4½. Under this condition we also have g < (½ + 1)2 and ¸m < 0. Note that
the derivation of equilibrium values is independent on the initial conditions and even on
the predation time T. Therefore, the same equilibrium values would be obtained if Firm
1 has a monopolistic position from the beginning (see Section 3.1 and Vinogradov and
· Zigi· c, 1999).
Finally, using the above initial condition, the optimal solutions are
qm(t) =
(A ¡ c0)(2½ ¡ g(1 ¡ ¯))






(A ¡ c0)(2½ ¡ g(1 ¡ ¯))




½ + 1 +
p





where ¸m = 1
2
³
½ ¡ 1 ¡
p
(½ + 1)2 ¡ g
´
. The resulting price can be then computed as
pm(t) = A ¡ qm(t). Depending on the sign of 2½ ¡ g(1 ¡ ¯), the R&D investment may
be decreasing or increasing over time. Then, the monopoly quantity qm(t) is moving in
the same direction, whereas the monopoly price pm(t) is moving in the opposite direction
re°ecting the fact that higher R&D investments lead to lower unit costs for Firm 1 and
consequently to a lower the monopoly price.
4.5 Sustainability of Constrained and Unconstrained Monopoly
In order for unconstrained monopoly to be sustainable, it is necessary that Firm 2 does
not re-enter the market after time T. This is the case when pm(t) < c2(t). Note that the
unconstrained monopoly optimization problem does not take at all into account the path
of Firm 2's costs. In order to prevent Firm 2 from entering the market it is particularly
necessary that the above inequality is satis¯ed for steady-state values, i.e., that A¡qm ·
c0. This can be equivalently rewritten as
g ¸ 2½: (62)
Thus for g · 2½, Firm 1 by following the optimal path of investments gives Firm 2 a
chance to re-enter the market sometimes after time T (or eventually at time T).
On the other hand, constrained monopoly is sustainable, when pcm(t) · pm(t). Oth-
erwise, it is pro¯table for Firm 1 to lower the price to the unconstrained monopoly level,
which still prevents Firm 2 from entering the market. Again, it is necessary the above
inequality is satis¯ed for steady-state values, i.e., c0 · 1




tuting the value of x¤
cm derived in Section 4.3, we obtain equivalent inequality g · 2½,
23which is the reverse inequality as in (62). The following lemma summarizes the above
results.
Lemma 7 Assume that Firm 2 is eliminated at time T. Then:
1. For unconstrained monopoly to be sustainable, it is necessary that g ¸ 2½.
2. For constrained monopoly to be sustainable, it is necessary that g · 2½.
5 Accommodation versus Strategic Predation
5.1 Choosing Optimal Strategy
Finally, we are in a position to determine, what would be the best strategy for Firm 1. It
can opt for one of the two basic strategies:
1. Accommodation: Optimize its duopoly pro¯t over time.
2. Strategic predation: In the ¯rst stage minimize the time needed to eliminate Firm
2 for good (which incurs losses of pro¯t) and then in the second round enjoy (con-
strained or unconstrained) monopoly position.
The comparison is straightforward: in both situations it is technically feasible to
evaluate the overall pro¯t and determine the optimal strategy. Note that for strategic
predation the pro¯t consists from two parts corresponding to the predation phase and
constrained or unconstrained monopoly phase. However, depending on the underlying
parameters some of the strategies might not be sustainable.
5.2 Assessing Optimal Predation Timing
Since the equilibrium and the optimal paths in duopoly are discussed in details in Sec-
tion 3, we focus here on the second strategy of Firm 1. That is, the strategy that ¯rst
aims to eliminate the competitor (we assume that the duopoly is initial market structure)
and then Firm 1 enjoys the constrained or unconstrained monopoly position afterwards.










24When Firm 1 attempts to gain the position of a monopolist by given time T by setting
R&D expenditures at the (constant) level dictated by (48), and with q(t) de¯ned by (49).
Substituting the closed form solution (50) together with (48) into the pro¯t function (63),






























The resulting expression is rather complicated and will not be listed here. All details
and results of computations (also for the following computations) can be obtained from
authors upon request. Note that when the adjustment is instantaneous (¹ ! 1), the




2g ¡ 1](1 ¡ e
¡rT): (65)
In constrained monopoly optimization problem discussed in Section 4.3 the optimal
R&D level was uniquely de¯ned in equation (57). Thus the evolution of costs ccm(t) in
program (56) can be explicitly derived from the equation _ ccm = ¹
¡





with xcm = z2
cm, as given by (57). Using the boundary condition ccm(T) = c1(T), we can





[(c2(t) ¡ ccm(t))(A ¡ c2(t)) ¡ xcm(t)]e
¡rtdt:
This equation uniquely de¯nes the optimal constrained monopoly pro¯t as a function of
time T when the position of a constrained monopolist is gained. Since c2(t), zcm(t), and
also ccm(t) can be written as functions of (t ¡ T), the pro¯t Icm(T) can be written in
the form X ¢ e¡rT, with X being independent on T. This is a consequence of the fact
that the initial values in the second phase (i.e., at time T) do not depend on T. Hence,
the constrained monopoly pro¯t depends on T only through the discount factor and X
can be interpreted as the present value of all future pro¯ts at the time when Firm 2
is eliminated. Note that when the adjustment is instantaneous (¹ ! 1), the optimal





25Finally, in order to ¯nd optimal T (if any) that maximizes total pro¯t of Firm 1




[Ip(T) + Icm(T)]: (67)
The above maximization problem represents the trade-o® between incurring high costs in
order to eliminate Firm 2 early, or delaying high constrained monopoly pro¯ts when Firm
2 is eliminated later. Recall that in the predation phase the optimal R&D investments
are decreasing in T. Hence, an early elimination (i.e., low T) requires signi¯cant R&D
investments in the predation phase. This may even lead to instantaneous losses (i.e.,
the instantaneous pro¯t is negative). These losses are compensated later when Firm 2
is eliminated. On the other hand, when elimination is delayed (i.e., T is high), Firm
1 invests less in R&D in the predation phase, but at the same time delays high pro¯ts
earned in the constrained monopoly phase (as noted above the present value of those
pro¯ts X is independent on T). The optimal value of T can be computed from the ¯rst
order condition. However, the resulting equation (with T as unknown) is not solvable
analytically, unless ¹ ! 1.
When ¹ ! 1, from (65) and (66) we obtain that the pro¯t from predation strategy is
decreasing in T whenever g < 2, i.e., constrained monopoly is sustainable20 (see Appendix
for details). Hence the optimal value of T is zero. This re°ects the fact that when the
adjustment is instantaneous, Firm 1 eliminates the rival immediately. In this case it has
a pro¯t given by (66) with T = 0.
Similarly we can proceed when Firm 1 becomes an unconstrained monopolist in the










with qm(t) and zm(t) given by (60){(61). Again, the above equation uniquely de¯nes the
optimal unconstrained monopoly pro¯t as a function of time T when the position of an
unconstrained monopolist is gained. Since qm(t) and zm(t) can be written as functions
of (t ¡ T),21 the pro¯t Im(T) can again be written in the form X ¢ e¡rT, with X be-
ing independent on T. When the adjustment is instantaneous (¹ ! 1), the optimal





20Note that ½ ! 1 as ¹ ! 1.
21In this case they are even linear functions of e¸m¹(t¡T).
26In order to ¯nd the optimal predation time T that maximizes total pro¯t of Firm 1
pursuing predation strategy with unconstrained monopoly in the second phase, we have
to solve the following univariate unconstrained optimization problem:
max
T
[Ip(T) + Im(T)] (69)
The ¯rst order condition for this problem is an equation with T as unknown which is not
solvable analytically.
Again when ¹ ! 1, from (65) and (68) we obtain that the pro¯t from predation
strategy is decreasing in T (see Appendix for details). Hence the optimal value of T is
zero, which re°ects the fact that when the adjustment is instantaneous, Firm 1 eliminates
the rival immediately. Then its pro¯t is
(A¡c0)2g
(4¡g)r , as given by (68) with T = 0.
5.3 Long-run Optimality
In order to asses the optimal strategy for Firm 1, we now compare its two possible payo®s:
accommodating strategy payo® (or duopoly payo®) de¯ned by (13), and the payo® that
arise from the dynamic strategic predation, with either constrained or unconstrained
monopoly in the second phase. Lemma 7 implies that both constrained and unconstrained
monopoly cannot be simultaneously sustainable (with exception of g = 2½, which de¯nes
a set of measure zero).
As g > gd yields clear-cut prediction of monopoly (Lemma 6), ¯ > 1
2 yields clear-
cut prediction of duopoly (see Lemmas 4{6 and Section 4.1), we will further restrict our
comparison of the accommodation and predation strategies to the region
R = f(¯;g) 2 R
2 : 0 · ¯ < 1
2; 0 < g < gdg: (70)
Further denote Rcm = f(¯;g) 2 R : g < 2½g the region where only constrained
monopoly can be sustained and Rm = f(¯;g) 2 R : g > 2½g the region where only
unconstrained monopoly can be sustained. We then need to compare pro¯t from duopoly
to the pro¯t from strategic predation with constrained monopoly (given by problem (67))
in region Rcm and the pro¯t from duopoly to the pro¯t from strategic predation with
unconstrained monopoly (which is given by problem (69)) in region Rm. The regions
are illustrated on Figure 5.22 As indicated, the curve represents the equality g = gd,
which is the upper boundary for duopoly to be feasible. As mentioned in Section 3.3,
this boundary shifts downwards with increasing ¹. Thus as speed of adjustment increase,
22Regions Rcm and Rm are labelled as \CM=D" and \UM=D".
27the region below, at which duopoly is feasible, shrinks. This is intuitive since a larger
value of ¹ enables Firm 1 to attain cheaper and faster the critical unit cost di®erence that
eventually may lead to monopoly. The horizontal line represents the equality g = 2½,
which is the boundary between constrained and unconstrained monopoly. Again, this
line shifts downwards as ¹ increases. Thus, unconstrained monopoly becomes easier to
sustain compared to constrained monopoly (note that the upper boundary g = 4½ shifts
downwards too). Note that the intersection of these boundaries, namely g = 2½ and
g = gd, is given by equation ¯2¡3¯ + 1




Insert Figure 5 HERE
As mentioned in Section 4.1, our model of predation is feasible only if ¯ < ¹ ¯ as given
by (52). However, note that in all cases the optimal values of q, z, and price margins
(de¯ned as the di®erence of price and unit costs) are homogeneous of degree 1 in (A;c0).23
Moreover, they can be written in form (A ¡ c0) ¢ X, where X is independent on both A
and c0. Therefore, in all cases the optimal pro¯ts, consumer surplus, social welfare, and
present value of R&D investment are homogeneous of degree 2 in (A;c0) and can be
written in form (A ¡ c0)2 ¢ Y , with Y being independent on both A and c0. Hence, any
comparison of those variables does not depend on A and c0; it can depend only on ¯, g,
¹ and r.24
Using the simulation technique, we compare predation and accommodation in region R
(recall that duopoly is feasible in this region). We ¯nd that when the speed of adjustment
¹ is small, accommodation is more pro¯table in almost everywhere in both regions Rcm
and Rm, as shown on Figure 6. However, with increasing speed of adjustment, predation
(with either constrained or unconstrained monopoly in the second phase) becomes likely;
see Figures 7, 8.25
23In the paper we do not provide the exact formula only for Firm 1's price margin in constrained
monopoly. All details about its computation and resulting expression can be obtained from authors upon
request.
24Since ¹ ¯ depends on A=c0, in order to facilitate the comparison for all values of A and c0, we disregard
the feasibility condition ¯ < ¹ ¯ and consider 1
2 as the upper bound for ¯ (which is also the upper bound
of ¹ ¯).
25The simulations have been performed using the Mathematica 5.0 software. The program code can
be obtained from authors upon request. In all presented simulation results we used the values r = 0:05,
A = 1, and c0 = 0:8 (however, due to the discussion above, the results do not depend on values of A and
c0). Given the value of ¹, Firm 1's pro¯ts from duopoly and strategic predation (for optimal T solving
the problem (67) or (69)) were computed for values of (¯;g) taken from a grid with density 0:0025£0:025
28Insert Figure 6 HERE
Insert Figure 7 HERE
Insert Figure 8 HERE
Insert Figure 9 HERE
In Figures 7 and 8, the lower boundary represents the equality between Firm 1's
pro¯ts from accommodation strategy (duopoly) and strategic predation (with constrained
monopoly in region Rcm and unconstrained monopoly in region Rm). In the region above
the boundary (i.e., when R&D e±ciency g is high), Firm 1 prefers strategic predation
whereas in the region below, Firm 1 prefers the accommodation strategy. With increasing
¹, this lower boundary shifts downwards as well, and apparently more than the upper
boundary, resulting in ever increasing parameter space for which strategic predation is
the optimal strategy. Figures 10 and 11 support this intuition.26 The ¯gures show the
dependence of the area where strategic predation is optimal in regions Rcm and Rm,
respectively, on the speed of adjustment ¹.
Insert Figure 10 HERE
Insert Figure 11 HERE
Figure 9 shows the set of parameters where predation is optimal, when adjustment
is instantaneous (i.e., ¹ ! 1). This can be obtained by comparing the duopoly pro¯t
(40) with (66) and (68). As opposed to the previous cases, here it is possible to ¯nd an
explicit formula for the lower boundary and compute the area where predation is optimal.
We obtain that Firm 1 chooses strategic predation in the whole region Rm. In region
on the set [0; 1
2) £ (0;4½). Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the results for values ¹ = 0:2, ¹ = 2, and ¹ = 20
respectively.
26The simulations have again been performed using the Mathematica 5.0 software, for the same values
of parameters r, A, and c0 as before. For each ¹ from the grid with density 0:2 on [0:2;25], we computed
the area as integral of a piecewise linear function approximating the lower boundary (in 100 points with
an absolute error lower than 10¡4).
29Rcm, Firm 1 chooses strategic predation in about 71% (see below). The lower bound is




2(2¡¯)2 , which can be obtained by equating pro¯ts
(40) with (66).
It can be easily computed that with instantaneous speed of adjustment, region Rm
has area 0:2640.27 Figure 10 indicates that the area where predation is optimal converges
towards this value as ¹ ! 1. Furthermore, the area of the whole region Rcm is 0:9524,28
whereas predation is optimal in Rcm in a domain with area 0:6773.29 The convergence is
again indicated in Figure 11.
6 Welfare analysis
In the previous section we have found that Firm 1 prefers in most cases accommodation
to predation when the speed of adjustment is small, but the relation becomes reversed
when the speed of adjustment is large. In this section we analyze the welfare e®ects of
predation. In particular, we are interested in comparison of consumers surplus and social
welfare for strategic predation and accommodation. From the viewpoint of competition
policy, strategic behavior is mostly prohibited since it eliminates the competing ¯rm.
However, from economic perspective, one needs to take into account the e®ects on the
economy as whole. In particular, in case of predation, there may be signi¯cant gains
from large R&D investments, which are often disregarded by competition policies. We
therefore start the analysis by comparing the R&D investments.
6.1 R&D investment
Compared to the accommodation strategy, strategic predation requires a signi¯cantly
higher investment in R&D in the ¯rst phase. This way Firm 1 rapidly decreases its own
and due to spillovers also rival's costs. Therefore, the quantities the ¯rms produce increase
and the price decreases. However, as spillovers are imperfect, Firm 2's decrease in costs
is less rapid and at time T its costs become equal to the equilibrium price. Firm 2 is not
able to compete with Firm 1 further, but it remains as a threat. The shorter the targeted
































29This area can be computed as di®erence of the area of region Rcm and
R 1=2





17) ¡ 2arcsin 2
3 + 2arcsin 8
9.
30predation time T is, the more rapid decrease in unit costs and hence the higher R&D
investment is necessary.
As shown in Section 3.2.3, when Firm 1 follows the accommodation strategy, its
optimal R&D investment continuously increases over time and converges to the value
x¤ = (z¤)2, where z¤ is given by (33). On the other hand, when Firm 1 follows strategic
predation strategy, the R&D investment pro¯le is rather di®erent. In predation phase,
the R&D investment is constant over time and is equal to (zu(T))2, whereas in the second
phase, it is xcm in constrained and xm in unconstrained monopoly.30




9½ ¡ g(2 ¡ ¯)2
g(2 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ 2¯)
¢
1
1 ¡ e¡¹T >
1
1 ¡ e¡¹T > 1:
The inequality holds everywhere in region R. As we can see, the R&D investment in
predation phase is higher than the steady-state investment in duopoly. Moreover, the
gap is larger when targeted elimination time T is smaller. Since the R&D investment in
duopoly is increasing over time, then
z
u(T) > zopt(t); for t 2 (0;T]: (71)
On the other hand, the relation between the investment in duopoly and constrained
or unconstrained monopoly phase is ambiguous. A direct computation reveals that for
g ! g
¡
d the steady-state of R&D in duopoly is higher than the ones in constrained and
unconstrained monopoly (whatever is feasible). However, this relation becomes weaker,
when g becomes smaller. In particular z¤ < z¤
cm, when g ! 0+.
As the investment level in the second phase of predation may be lower than the steady-
state investment level in duopoly, we cannot make a clear-cut comparison of R&D invest-
ments between strategic predation and accommodation. Therefore, we compare their
present values. The present value of R&D investments for the accommodation strategy, is
equal to
R 1
0 x(t)e¡rtdt. The present value of R&D investments for the predation strategy
is de¯ned analogously, but consists of two parts: the present value in the predation phase
and the present value in the constrained or unconstrained monopoly phase. As the ex-
pressions are rather complicated (we omit them here), for comparison we used numerical
simulations. We perform the simulations in the same way and for the same parameter
values as we do for comparison of pro¯ts. The simulations show that for small values of
30Following previous notation, we de¯ne zcm = (xcm)2 and zm = (xm)2.
31¹, the present value of R&D investment is always (i.e., in region R) larger when Firm 1
follows the predation strategy. This result is rather intuitive, since in the predation phase,
Firm 1 makes huge R&D investments in order eliminate the rival. Moreover, the result
conforms to the result by Etro (2004) that a leader may have greater R&D incentives in
order to defend his position. However, as the speed of adjustment ¹ increases, the present
value of R&D investments for accommodation strategy may be higher above the value
in predation. This occurs in a small region near the upper boundary, where signi¯cant
investments are pro¯table due to high R&D e±ciency g; see Figures 12 and 13.31 As we
can see, this region does not increase signi¯cantly with increasing ¹. Figure 14 shows this
region when ¹ ! 1.32
Insert Figure 12 HERE
Insert Figure 13 HERE
Insert Figure 14 HERE
6.2 Consumer surplus
Now we turn our attention to the e®ects on consumers. As already mentioned above,
the intuition suggests that since investment in R&D decreases the cost of production, it
increases the quantity produced and hence lowers the market price. Therefore, intuitively
we can predict that the e®ect of higher investment in the predation phase on consumers
should be positive. When Firm 1 follows the predation strategy, the R&D investment
lowers the price rapidly in the ¯rst phase. If it becomes constrained monopolist in the
second phase, the price will increase and converge to c0. On the other hand, if Firm 1
becomes unconstrained monopolist in the second phase, the price will be monotone but
may be both increasing or decreasing, depending on parameters. Figures 15 and 16 show
the comparison of this time patterns to the price pattern for the accommodation strategy.
31The shaded area represent those values of parameters where the present value of R&D investments
in accommodation is higher than the one in predation.












with unconstrained monopoly (recall that the optimal predation time is T = 0 in this case). Figure 14
was obtained directly by comparing those values.
32Insert Figure 15 HERE
Insert Figure 16 HERE
For a better exposition and in order to be able to evaluate the e®ects on social welfare,
we compare the present value of consumer surplus. First consider the instantaneous













This is a classical form of consumer surplus for linear demand. Then the present value





q2(t))2e¡rtdt. The above formula shows that consumers surplus is negatively related to
the price. According to our intuition, we might expect the consumer surplus to be higher,
when Firm 1 follows the predation strategy.
Insert Figure 17 HERE
Insert Figure 18 HERE
Insert Figure 19 HERE
Indeed, strategic predation yields a lower price than accommodation at any (positive)
time in the predation phase. Moreover, if g · 3½=(2 ¡ ¯), then strategic predation also
yields a lower price at any time in the constrained monopoly phase. The proofs of both
these statements can be found in Appendix. As a consequence, if g · 3½=(2¡¯), then the
consumer surplus from strategic predation is higher that the one from accommodation.
Conversely, if g > 3½=(2 ¡ ¯) then p¤ < c0, which means that the price in strategic
predation raises the constrained monopoly price at some point in time. In this case we
cannot make a direct inference about consumer surplus.
The above results suggest that a higher level of R&D investments in predation phase
bene¯ts consumers. It is necessary to point out that this is a consequence of how the
predation works. Firm 1 needs to signi¯cantly lower the price so that it is equal to
opponent's marginal costs, which in result bene¯ts the consumers.
33In order to complete the analysis, we again perform numerical simulations. They
show that for low values of ¹, consumer surplus from predation is always larger than
the one from accommodation. However, similarly as for the R&D investments, as the
speed of adjustment ¹ increases, there is a small region where consumer surplus from
accommodation is higher, as shown on Figures 17 and 18.33 When ¹1, this region
covers a substantial part of region Rm, but only a small part of region Rcm, as shown on
Figure 19.34
6.3 Social welfare
The instantaneous social welfare is de¯ned as the sum of consumers surplus and ¯rms'
pro¯ts (by Firm 1's pro¯ts we mean the net pro¯t, i.e., after subtracting the R&D costs).
Drawing on previous results, it is not possible (with exception of small domains) to make
a clear comparison of social welfare for accommodation and predation strategies.
Hence similarly as in previous cases, we compare the social welfare using simulation
technique and perform the simulations in the same way and for the same parameter values
as we did for comparison of pro¯ts. The results for di®erent values of ¹ are shown on
Figures 20, 21, and 22.35 The result when ¹ ! 1 is shown on Figure 23 (obtained
partially by numerical simulations).
The simulations show that the relation between the strategy chosen by Firm 1 and
the socially optimal strategy is ambiguous. There are regions where Firm 1 chooses its
strategy e±ciently, i.e., where Firm 1's choice and social welfare are higher for the same
strategy (accommodation or predation). However, there is a region, where accommodation
is the more desirable outcome from social point of view, but Firm 1 prefers predation.
This creates a need for appropriate anti-competitive remedies.
Surprisingly, there is also a region where Firm 1 chooses accommodation, but predation
is more e±cient. This region is described by either small spillovers or high e±ciency of
R&D and it shrinks with increasing speed of adjustment ¹. Note that it disappears
33The shaded area represent those values of parameters where consumer surplus in accommodation is
higher than the one in predation.




2[9¡(2¡¯)2g]2r for accommodation strategy,
(A¡c0)
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(4¡g)2r for predation with unconstrained monopoly (again recall that the optimal predation time
is T = 0 in this case). Figure 19 was obtained directly by comparing those values.
35The shaded area represent those values of parameters where social welfare in accommodation is higher
than the one in predation.
34when ¹ ! 1. However, this is an important remedy for competition policy. Although
predatory behavior is considered as anticompetitive act, from economic point of view, it
can lead to an increase in social welfare. The appropriate policy should then support
Firm 1's predatory behavior (for example using subsidies; see also Footnote 7).
Insert Figure 20 HERE
Insert Figure 21 HERE
Insert Figure 22 HERE
Insert Figure 23 HERE
7 Conclusion
The empirical ¯ndings and stylized facts concerning the relation between innovativeness,
leadership and market power, have motivated out paper in that we aim to describe and
analyze a particular setup in which the persistence of monopoly is likely to arise in the
long run. More speci¯cally, we study the situation in which the market leader undertakes
pre-emptive R&D investment (\strategic predation") that eventually leads to exit of the
follower ¯rm. It is also important to stress that we allow the follower to bene¯t via
R&D spillovers from the R&D activity of the leader. We then, within the same basic
setup, contrast the outcomes of strategy predation with the ones in which the leader
\accommodates' the follower in a duopoly market structure. This comparison enables
us to study positive aspects of the two main strategies of the leader | accommodation
and strategic predation- as well as social welfare implications of the two resulting market
structures | duopoly and constrained monopoly.
In studying the above phenomenon, we ¯rst start with static analysis and then sub-
sequently develop a corresponding dynamic model. While the very comparison between
the static model and its dynamic counterpart is an insightful exercise per se, we argue
that, due to inherently dynamic phenomenon of innovation activity, a dynamic model is
better suited at capturing both accommodating and the pre-emptive or predatory behav-
ior of the leader, and consequently, it ¯ts better with observed empirical ¯ndings about
persistence of monopoly and its high intensity of innovative activity.
35While monopoly appears marginal market structure in a static environment and is
therefore often excluded from the analysis by assumptions (e.g., by restrictions on param-
eters), in the dynamic setup when there is a fast adoption of the new technology, on the
contrary, this market structure becomes the prevalent one and strategic predation turns
out to be the dominant market strategy in general. The quicker the time of the innovation
adoption, the larger the range, in which the predation becomes the optimal strategy. Both
R&D intensity and R&D stock are likely to be larger in predation strategy compared to
accommodation strategy. Put together, these two facts yield a testable prediction in that
the most propulsive innovative ¯rms, that commercialize their investment in innovation
quickly, are the ones likely to use the strategy predation through investing large sums of
money into innovative activity (cf. AT&T, Microsoft, etc.).
As for the social welfare considerations, strategic predation as dominant market strat-
egy may be socially preferable as well since it might lead to both higher consumer surplus,
and (even more often) to higher social welfare generated despite the fact that only one
¯rm (the leader) remains in the market in the long run. This all bears important com-
petition policy implications. First, the size of market share per se might not be su±cient
condition for a legal o®ence and, second, abuses of dominant positions may not even be
an issue in dynamic markets where competition takes place through investments in R&D
rather than through static pricing and where the very presence of competitors constrain
the behavior of market leaders. The challenge for the design of antitrust policy against
predation is related to the ability of the antitrust authority to distinguish between the
price that is low for other predatory purposes from a price that might be set very low
as part of an e±ciency enhancing process that in turn results in enhanced competition
leading in the end to the exit of the competitors but also in the enhancement in the both
consumer surplus and social welfare. For instance, in the presence of network e®ects or
learning e®ects it would be legitimate and consistent with vigorous competition that ¯rms
set very low prices when they are introducing new products, when they are targeting new
customer segments or rivals, installed bases, or when they are in the ¯rst phase of the
learning curve. Thus, the competition authority with limited knowledge of industry- and
¯rm-speci¯c data faces a complex problem when attempting to identify those circum-
stances under which loss-inducing predatory prices cause harm to competition. For that
reason the antitrust authorities have to be fully aware of the risks of misclassi¯cation
when approaching a predation case. Nevertheless, our model clearly favors still controver-
sial proposition of the e±ciency defenses of the dominant ¯rms that allows for otherwise
abusive strategy for the dominant ¯rm if it creates a net e±ciency gains which bene¯ts
36consumers.36
However, our results concerning both private and social optimality of strategic pre-
dation are obtained under the assumption of goods homogeneity. As we know (at least
from Dixit, 1979), product di®erentiation makes the strategic predation more di±cult and
more costly for the leader. Moreover, strategic predation in this case leads to less product
varieties in the market, and this in turn harms consumers. However, by the continuity
argument, it is pretty safe to claim that all our ¯ndings would also hold in the situation
when the degree of product di®erentiation is not \large," that is, when the goods are
\close" substitutes.
Another policy concern that can arise in the above setup might be that the policy
makers worry of having only one ¯rm in the market as was recently the case with the
General Electric and Honeywell banned merger. This could be an issue if there is no
credible threat from entry of any other ¯rm because the size of the entry barriers is high
but this again leads to Etro's remark (2006) that the barriers to entry should be targeted
rather than market leaders. In the technical sense, our analysis could be further extended
in a several directions. The speed of adjustment could be \endogenized" as a function of
the R&D intensity or R&D stock, for instance. Furthermore, we could model the last,
quantity competition stage between the leader and follower explicitly by relying on the
concepts of state dependent strategies and Markov perfect equilibria. This approach can
make the game even more \dynamic" with possibly additional insights.
36Etro (2006) gives a nice summery of the controversy. See also Rey et al. (2005), and the discussion
paper on the reform of Art. 82 of the Treaty on exclusionary abuses by the European Commission, 2005.
37A APPENDIX: Proofs and Derivations
Proof of Lemma 1:
Introducing the new time scale d¿ = ¹dt, in matrix notation system (31,32) reads as
dY
d¿

















Tr(¡) = ½ ¡ 1 = r
¹ > 0 { which implies that the sum of eigenvalues ¸1; ¸2 is always
positive.
Det(¡) = ¡½+°2 < 0 { which means that the product of the eigenvalues is negative.
D = (Tr(¡))2 ¡ 4Det(¡) = (½ + 1)2 ¡ 4°2 > (½ + 1)2 ¡ 4½ = (½ ¡ 1)2 ¸ 0 { which
yields that the eigenvalues are real.
Therefore, if °2 < ½ then the eigenvalues are real and of opposite sign (i.e. the
equilibrium is a saddle). The latter proves the existence of a unique trajectory converging
to the steady state (a stable arm of a saddle).37
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
(i) Since ¯ is always positive, (35) holds true when the right-hand side of (35) is
negative, i.e. for g < 9
4½.
Moreover, by construction the generalized discount factor ½ ¸ 1. As ¹ (the speed of
adjustment) tends to in¯nity, ½ monotonically declines to 1, and min½ = 1. Therefore,
with g < 9
4 min½ = 9
4 the RHS of (35) always remains negative for any constellation of ¯,
¹ and r.
(ii) Since max° = 4
3, the condition ¹ < 9
7r guarantees that ½ = r
¹ + 1 > 16
9 = max°2.
Therefore, for any °, ½ > °2.
Q.E.D.
37Loosely speaking, an equilibrium (z¤;q¤) is
1. unstable focus if D < 0 (¸1;2 are complex) and Tr(¡) > 0 (Re(¸1;2) > 0); holds true for ° >
½+1
2 ;
2. unstable node, if D ¸ 0 (¸1;2 are real) and Det(¡) ¸ 0 (¸1;¸2 ¸ 0); holds true for
p
½ · ° ·
½+1
2 ;
3. saddle, if D ¸ 0 and Det(¡) < 0 (¸1 < 0 < ¸2); holds true for °2 < ½.
However, in our model the ¯rst two options are ruled out due to non-negativity of z.
38Derivation of the analytical solution to system (31, 32).
The eigenvalues of ¡ are
¸1;2 =
½ ¡ 1 §
p








(r + 2¹)2 ¡ 4°2¹2
´
; ¸1 < 0 < ¸2;




















Therefore, the general solution to (72) becomes
Y (¿) = C1U1e
¸1¿ + C2U2e
¸2¿ + Yp;
where C1; C2 are arbitrary constants and the particular solution Yp is a constant solution







The transversality condition demands for C2 = 0 (in other words, the optimal solution
must be bounded).












½ ¡ °2 ¢
2°
½ + 1 +
p
(½ + 1)2 ¡ 4°2e
¸1¿ + z
¤;











½ ¡ °2 ¢
2°
½ + 1 +
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2 ¹t + z
¤:
Q.E.D.
39Optimal solution to (23), (24) with ¹ ! 1 by applying Euler's equation.
Under instantaneous adjustment scenario, as ¹ ! 1, equation (24) becomes
q(t) = B + °z;




















Therefore, in the limiting case the optimal level of R&D expenditures is constant over
time and coincides with the equilibrium value of z¤ in (33) evaluated at ¹ ! 1.
Proof of Lemma 3:
_ q = ¹(B ¡ q + °z).
Therefore _ q + ¹q = f(t) with f(t) = ¹B + ¹°z(t) > 0 for all t ¸ 0.











which is always positive.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5:
Necessity follows from Lemma 4. To prove su±ciency, ¯rst note that q¤
2 = B + °2z¤.
Thus non-positivity of q¤














The latter inequality simpli¯es to
1 ·
(1 ¡ 2¯)(2 ¡ ¯)
9
½
g ¡ (2 ¡ ¯)2
40and can be further re-arranged as
3½
g
· (2 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¯); or g ¸
3½
(2 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¯)
´ gd: (73)
Given that ½ ¸ °2 = 1















2 < (2 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¯);
i.e., ¯ < 1
2 is necessary for q¤
2 to be non-positive.
Q.E.D.
An alternative approach to the optimal predation problem.
In order to eliminate Firm 2, Firm 1 must lower its price below the costs of production
of Firm 2, i.e. the following condition must hold:
A ¡ q1(t) · c2(t):
In other words, at the very moment the price of Firm 1 falls below the costs of Firm
2, Firm 1 becomes a constrained monopolist.
Therefore, the corresponding optimization problem for Firm 1 is very similar to that
elaborated earlier: the condition for becoming a constrained monopolist reads as
A ¡ q1(T) = c2(T);
or, in other words,
q1(T) + c2(T) = A:
With two equations of motion of q1 and c2 in hand
_ q1 = ¹(B ¡ q1 + °1z)
and
_ c2 = ¹(c0 ¡ c2 ¡ ¯
p
gz)
we can introduce the new variable (say, »), » = q1+c2, which must satisfy the boundary
conditions
»(0) = q1(0) + c2(0) = B + c0; »(T) = A;
41and is subject to the following equation of motion:
_ » = ¹(B + c0 ¡ » + (°1 ¡ ¯
p
g)z):
Therefore { with a few modi¯cation { the optimization problem under consideration




s.t. _ » = ¹(B + c0 ¡ » + (°1 ¡ ¯
p
g)z);
»(0) = B + c0; »(T) = A; T is free;
and z 2 [0;zu]:
And there is little wonder that the solution of (74) will be identical to (47) and (48).
Derivation of optimal solution in constrained monopoly.
With c2(t) given by (55), the objective functional in (56) expands to the sum
Z +1
T






in which the second term integrates to a constant, say, K, that does not depend on the













= ¹(c0 ¡ ccm(t) ¡
p
gx(t)):
In order to solve the above problem, we form Hamiltonian H = [ccm(t)(Ke¡¹t+c0¡A)¡
x(t)]e¡rt+¸(t)¹(c0¡ccm(t)¡
p
gx(t)) with ¯rst order conditions Hx = 0 and Hccm = ¡_ ¸
and transversality condition limt!1 ¸(t)ccm(t) = 0. These yield the equation of motion
of optimal control variable:
_ x(t) = 2(r + ¹)x(t) + (Ke





or, in new variable z(t) =
p
x(t),






¡¹t + c0 ¡ A) (76)














42The transversality condition demands for boundedness of the optimal solution. Therefore











(1 ¡ 2¯)(r + 2¹)
¶
: (77)
Derivation of optimal predation time when ¹ ! 1.
First note that ½ ! 1 as ¹ ! 1. Therefore, the feasibility condition g < 4½ becomes
g < 4 and sustainability condition g < 2½ becomes g < 2.



















when ¹ ! 1. The coe±cient at e¡rT is positive if and only if
(1 ¡ 2¯)
2g
2 ¡ 4(1 ¡ ¯)
2g + 4 > 0:
We will show that this inequality holds for all ¯ 2 [0; 1
2] and g 2 [0;2]. Obviously it holds
for g · 1, since then (1¡2¯)2g2¡4(1¡¯)2g+4 ¸ ¡4(1¡¯)2+4 ¸ 0. On the other hand, for
g > 1, we rewrite the inequality in an equivalent form (2¡g)2+4g(2¡g)¯¡4g(1¡g)¯2 > 0,
which clearly holds when 1 < g < 2.






2g ¡ 1 +






when ¹ ! 1. As g < 4, the coe±cient at e¡rT is positive. Hence the pro¯t is decreasing
in T.
Comparison of prices in Section 6.2.
First we show that predation strategy yields a lower price in predation phase, i.e., for
t 2 (0;T]. Obviously, both prices are the same and equal to 1
3(A+2c0) at time t = 0. For
t > 0, both are described by a di®erential equation of the form (22), or
_ p = ¹((B + c0) + p(t) ¡ (°1 + °2)
p
gz(t));
where z(t) = zopt(t) for the accommodation strategy and z(t) = zu(T) for predation
strategy. According to (71), the latter is higher, yielding a lower price. This is easy
do see, when we consider the di®erence d between the duopoly price and the predation
price, which follows the di®erential equation _ d = ¹[d(t) ¡ (°1 + °2)(zopt(t) ¡ zu(T))],
43with initial condition d(0) = 0. Obviously d(t) > 0, since °1 + °2 = 1
3(1 + ¯) > 0 and
zopt(t) ¡ zu(T) < 0.
Now it remains to show that predation yields a lower price in the constrained monopoly
phase. Since the price is decreasing in duopoly and increasing in constrained monopoly,
it is su±cient to show the inequality for their limits, i.e., p¤ ¸ c0. Substitution of (39)










Figure 1: Region of \Strategic Predation"








Figure 2: R&D pattern for di®erent values of ¹: ¹ = 0:4;2;20








Figure 3: Growth rates of R&D for di®erent values of ¹: ¹ = 0:4;2;20



















Figure 5: Feasibility and sustainability regions










Figure 6: Strategic predation (simulation results for ¹ = 0:2)










Figure 7: Strategic predation (simulation results for ¹ = 2)










Figure 8: Strategic predation (simulation results for ¹ = 20)










Figure 9: Strategic predation when ¹ ! 1







Figure 10: Dependence of area where predation is preferred to duopoly on ¹, in region
Rcm (simulation results)






Figure 11: Dependence of area where predation is preferred to duopoly on ¹, in region
Rm (simulation results)







Figure 12: R&D investment comparison (simulation results for ¹ = 2)







Figure 13: R&D investment comparison (simulation results for ¹ = 20)













Figure 14: R&D investment comparison when ¹ ! 1











Figure 15: Pattern of price over time with constrained monopoly (¹ = 2, ¯ = 0:33, g = 1)











Figure 16: Pattern of price over time with unconstrained monopoly (¹ = 2, ¯ = 0:33,
g = 2:1)







Figure 17: Consumer surplus comparison (simulation results for ¹ = 2)







Figure 18: Consumer surplus comparison (simulation results for ¹ = 20)













Figure 19: Consumer surplus comparison when ¹ ! 1







Figure 20: Welfare comparison (simulation results for ¹ = 0:2)







Figure 21: Welfare comparison (simulation results for ¹ = 2)







Figure 22: Welfare comparison (simulation results for ¹ = 20)













Figure 23: Welfare comparison when ¹ ! 1 (partially simulation results)
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